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NOTES 
Evaluating Purely Reproductive Disorders Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
Todd Lebowitz 
Approximately 2.8 million American couples suffer from infer­
tility, 1 a condition generally defined by the medical community as 
the failure to conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse.2 
During the past thirty years, diagnostic and therapeutic techniques 
for treating infertility have improved drastically, enabling many 
previously infertile couples to bear children.3 These techniques, 
however, involve considerable expense and inconvenience, fre­
quently requiring patients to take time off from work.4 Disputes 
with employers may follow, sometimes resulting in the infertile em­
ployee's termination.5 Some terminated employees, claiming that 
infertility constitutes a disability, then sue their former employers6 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("the ADA" or 
"the Act").7 
In enacting the ADA, Congress specifically stated the Act's pur­
pose: "[T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disa­
bilities."8 The ADA's prohibition on disability-based discrimina-
1. See Luther M. Talbert, Overview of the Diagnostic Evaluation, in INFERTILITY: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PHYSICIAN 2 (Mary G. Hammond & Luther M. Talbert eds., 3d 
ed. 1992). 
2. See id.; MELVIN L. TAYMOR, INFERTILITY: A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT 11 {1990). 
3. See TAYMOR, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
4. See id. at 107. 
5. See, e.g., Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
{hearing the case of a plaintiff who was terminated after missing work to obtain infertility 
treatment); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995) {deciding 
the applicability of the ADA to a dispute involving the nonrenewal of a news anchor's con­
tract after she asked for reduced work hours to accommodate her infertility treatment pro­
gram), affd., 19 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 
1396 (N.D. Ill. 1994) {hearing the case of a plaintiff who was terminated after missing work to 
obtain infertility treatment). 
6. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 676-77 {8th Cir. 1996); 
Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 316; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 240; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1393. 
7. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 {1994). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l{b) In addition, the Act recognizes as a national goal the assurance of 
"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-suffi­
ciency" for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){8). 
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tion in employment specifically provides: "No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because 
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application pro­
cedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em­
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment."9 The ADA also specifies, in a seven­
part description, the types of behavior that constitute discrimina­
tion against an individual with a disability.10 
Congress failed, however, to state with the same specificity what 
constitutes a disability in the first place; instead, the Act broadly 
defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that sub­
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] indi­
vidual."11 Infertile individuals seeking ADA protection have 
argued that their impairments constitute ADA-protected disabili­
ties because they "substantially limit" the "major life activity" of 
reproduction.12 
The question of whether infertility fits within this broad defini­
tion of disability is complicated by the fact that infertility is not al-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). Some examples of discriminatory behavior include: segre­
gating job applicants in a way that adversely affects individuals with disabilities; denying 
equal employment or benefits to an individual because of a disability; failing to acco=odate 
reasonably an individual's disability; and using selection criteria that tend to screen out 
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Congress adopted for the ADA the same definition of disa­
bility that it used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Fair Housing Act. See Rehabilita­
tion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 103-73, 107 Stat. 718, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 706(8)(B) (1993) (defining "individual with handicaps" with language identical to the ADA 
definition of disability), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4348 (1992) (changing the 
phrase "individuals with handicaps" to "individual with a disability"); Fair Housing Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994) (defining 
"handicap"); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990) (indicating an intent that the 
ADA definition of disability be interpreted consistently with the definition of "individual 
with handicaps" in the Rehabilitation Act and "handicap" in the Fair Housing Act); H.R. 
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26-27 (1990) (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) (same). As 
a result, courts and co=entators alike consistently rely on Rehabilitation Act and Fair 
Housing Act cases for guidance in determining what constitutes a disability under the ADA. 
See, e.g., Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725 n.4, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
the ADA "definition of 'disability' is substantially equivalent to that in the Rehabilitation 
Act" and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ADA "regulations adopt 
the same definition of major life activities as used in the Rehabilitation Act"); Ennis v. Na­
tional Assn. of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (using case law 
developed under the Rehabilitation and Fair Housing Acts to interpret the term "disability" 
as used in the ADA); William G. Buss, Human Immunodeficiency Vims, the Legal Meaning 
of "Handicap," and Implications for Public Education Under Federal Law at the Dawn of the 
Age of the ADA, 77 low A L. REv. 1389, 1405-06 (1992); Jack P. DeSario & James D. Slack, 
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Refusals to Provide Medical Care to Persons with 
HIV/AIDS, 27 J.  MARsHALL L. REv. 347, 353 (1994). 
12. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Zatarain v. WDSU­
Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
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ways a medically distinct impairment. Rather, a variety of disorders 
may cause infertility, and many of these disorders affect activities 
other than reproduction.13 An ovarian tumor or a sexually trans­
mitted disease, for example, can cause infertility, but these condi­
tions can also limit participation in other activities. An ovarian 
tumor may limit a woman's ability to walk, and gonorrhea can 
cause blindness.14 For purposes of this Note, disorders affecting 
previously recognized "major life activities"15 and reproduction 
must be distinguished from disorders that affect only reproduction. 
This Note terms disorders that affect reproduction, but no other 
previously recognized major life activities, as purely reproductive 
disorders. This Note focuses only on the applicability of the ADA 
to purely reproductive disorders.16 
Courts are divided as to whether purely reproductive disorders 
may constitute disabilities. Litigants generally agree that purely re­
productive disorders are "impairments" that "substantially limit" 
the activity of reproduction.17 The crux of the legal dispute, there­
fore, is whether reproduction itself constitutes a "major life activ­
ity" under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit has held that sterile 
individuals may be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 18 a statute upon which the ADA based its definition of disa­
bility.19 Following this holding, district courts within that circuit 
have held that infertile individuals and those with reproductive dis­
orders that jeopardize a pregnancy are disabled under the ADA. 
These courts have based their holdings on a finding that reproduc­
tion is a major life activity.20 Other courts, in an effort to justify 
13. See generally TAYMOR, supra note 2, at 21-41 (discussing various factors that contrib­
ute to infertility in men and women). 
14. See ToMASz F. MROCZKOWSKI, SEXUALLY 'TuANsMITIED DISEASES 41 (1990); Cheryl 
L. Ivey, When Your Patient Has Ovarian Cancer, RN, Nov. 1994, at 26, 27. 
15. The major life activities explicitly recognized by Congress or the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission, or both, are as follows: caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, sitting, standing, lift­
ing, reaching, thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others. For a discussion and brief 
legal history of the recognition of these activities as major life activities under the Act, see 
infra text accompanying notes 88-92. 
16. This Note declines to consider reproductive disorders that affect other major life ac­
tivities because these reproductive disorders are clearly covered by the ADA and are there­
fore uncontroversial. 
17. See infra note 27. 
18. See McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that plain­
tiff stated a cognizable claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-797). 
19. See supra note 11. 
20. See Soodman v. Wtldman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1495, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997); Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 
316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 
1994). 
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ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV-positive21 individuals, have 
also classified reproduction as a major life activity.22 Outside of the 
Seventh Circuit, however, no court evaluating ADA coverage of 
purely reproductive disorders has classified reproduction as a major 
life activity. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have both held that in­
fertile individuals are not protected by the ADA because reproduc­
tion is not a major life activity.23 
This Note argues that purely reproductive disorders do not con­
stitute disabilities under the ADA. Part I examines the statutory 
language and interpretive guidelines24 that determine whether an 
impairment qualifies as a disability and concludes that it would be 
improper to interpret such language as covering purely reproduc­
tive disorders. Part II analyzes the legislative history of the Act and 
maintains that Congress did not intend to include purely reproduc­
tive disorders within the definition of disability. Part III identifies 
three characteristics common to all of the major life activities al­
ready recognized under the ADA and argues that because repro­
duction lacks these characteristics, i,t should not be recognized as a 
major life activity.25 Part IV contends that victims of discrimination 
may obtain relief through other, more appropriate legal avenues, 
making their reliance on the ADA unnecessary. 
21. "HIV" is the abbreviation for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, which causes Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 
· 
22. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-42 (1st Cir:1997); Doe v. Kohn, Nast 
& Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. 
Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992). 
23. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. 
WD SU-Television Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
24. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), pursuant to their Congressionally delegated authority, have issued guidelines 
for interpreting key terms and provisions of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1991) 
(EEOC); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1991) (DOJ). 
25. Although individuals with purely reproductive disorders do not suffer from an "im­
pairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities," they may nonetheless 
be eligible for ADA protection under the Act's "second definition" or "third definition." 
The ADA provides "second definition" and "third definition" ADA protection, respectively, 
to individuals who have a "record of' or are "regarded as" having a disability. Such coverage 
is available, however, only if the perceived disability includes, or is perceived to include, the 
components of a physical or mental impairment, substantial limitation, and major life activ­
ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), (C) (1994). As a result, an employee can be "disabled" 
under the ADA's third definition if her employer regards her to be substantially limited in a 
major life activity, even if, in reality, she is not limited at all. For a more complete discussion 
of third definition coverage, see infra note 141. This Note will limit its analysis to whether an 
individual with a purely reproductive disorder actually has a disability, that is, whether such 
an individual would qualify under the first definition. Nonetheless, because the concepts of 
"impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activity" are relevant to all three defini­
tions, the conclusions that follow may have the effect of limiting disability coverage under the 
second and third definitions as well. 
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I. PURELY REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS FAIL TO MEET THE 
ADA's THREE-PART DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
To qualify for coverage under the ADA, a disorder must satisfy 
the three necessary elements set out in the Act's definition of "disa­
bility": (a) a "physical or mental impairment" that (b) "substan­
tially limits" (c) a "major life activit[y]."26 Defendants in cases 
involving infertility often concede the presence of the first two com­
ponents, admitting that the plaintiffs' reproductive disorder is an 
impairment that substantially limits the ability to reproduce.27 In­
stead, they contest the applicability of the third component, arguing 
that reproduction is not a "major life activity" under the Act.28 
Some courts, however, have confused the debate by treating the 
first factor, impairment, as the sole determinant of disability status. 
This Part argues that courts following this approach misread the 
Act. 
Despite the statute's three essential components, some courts 
wrongly have used the definition of "impairment" as their defini­
tion of "disability," thus ignoring the statutory requirement that the 
impairment "substantially limit" a "major life activity" in order to 
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining a disability as "a physical or mental impair­
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual"); see 
also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-52 (1990) (construing the statutory definition as 
containing these three components); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990) (same); S. 
REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (same). The EEOC, to which Congress delegated authority to 
enforce Title I of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 1630.1, has also 
identified these three components as essential elements of a disability. See EEOC Comp!. 
Man. (CCH) § 902.1 (1993); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g). Title I of the ADA is the portion of 
the Act that specifically addresses discrimination in the employment context. 
27. See, e.g., Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677; Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 
(N.D. ill. 1994). 
Although the ADA does not define "impairment," Congress delegated the authority to 
define this component to the administrative agencies in charge of enforcing the Act. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12116-12117 (granting the EEOC authority to enforce Title I: Employment); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12134, 12186(b) (1994) (granting the Department of Justice authority to enforce 
Title II: Public Services, part A, and Title ID: Public Accommodations and Services Oper­
ated by Private Entities). These agencies have defined broadly the phrase "physical or 
mental impairment" in a manner that clearly includes physiological disorders or conditions 
affecting the reproductive system: 
Physical or mental impairment means: 
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss 
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe­
cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, 
digestive, genito-urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn­
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1991) (DOJ); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (DOJ); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (EEOC). 
28. See, e.g., Krauel, 95 F3d at 677; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404. 
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qualify as a disability.29 In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 3o one dis­
trict court concluded that because reproductive disorders are in­
cluded among impairments, it "logically follows" that reproduction 
qualifies as a major life activity. "Otherwise, it would have made 
no sense to include the reproductive system among the systems that 
can have an ADA impairment. "31 
This analysis, however, is fatally flawed because it ignores criti­
cal statutory language, thereby subverting Congress's intent to de­
fine the scope of ADA coverage based on the severity of an 
impairment rather than its type. The ADA's mechanism for limit­
ing the scope of its coverage lies in the "substantially limiting" and 
"major life activities" components - not in the list of examples of 
conditions that satisfy the "impairment" component. Congress and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have 
clearly stated that the presence of an impairment alone is not suffi­
cient to merit protection under the Act.32 In recommending pas­
sage of the ADA, the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the House Educa­
tion and Labor Committee agreed that an impairment does not 
constitute a disability unless its severity is such that it substantially 
limits one or more "major life activities."33 For example, a person 
with a "minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger is 
not impaired in a major life activity."34 Similarly, the EEOC de­
votes a full section of its ADA compliance manual to interpretation 
of the term "substantially limiting," differentiating between impair­
ments that substantially limit major life activities - and therefore 
constitute "disabilities" - and those that do not.3s 
By recognizing a range of impairments broader than the range 
of major life activities that may be impaired, the ADA defines its 
scope of protection based on the severity of an impairment, not 
merely on its type.36 Correspondingly, Congress and the EEOC in-
29. See, e.g., McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The regula­
tions define the protected class of handicapped individuals [under the Rehabilitation Act] to 
include any person with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system."); 
Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404-05 (applying McWright to the ADA). 
30. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
31. 858 F. Supp. at 1404. 
32. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 
(1990); S. REP. No. l(ll-116, at 22 (1989); EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.4. 
33. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. 
No. 101-116, at 22. 
34. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23. 
35. See EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.4. 
36. Compare Heilweil v. Mount Sinai, 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an asth­
matic hospital employee was not disabled when her condition only prevented her from work­
ing in one room) with carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that an 
employee with asthma was handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act, but was not "other­
wise qualified") and Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D. Md. 1984) (finding 
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struct that the· disability determination be made on an individual­
ized basis.37 Federal appellate courts agree that Congress intended 
for courts to follow this approach.38 As a result, courts generally 
conduct the disability inquiry on an individualized basis, determin­
ing the extent to which a particular plaintiff is limited in her major 
life activities.39 
The Pacourek court's approach, however, merges the first com­
ponent, "impairment," with the third component, "major life activ­
ity." This approach ignores both Congress's intent and the 
statutory language itself, because it "would allow [plaintiffs] to 
bootstrap a finding of substantial limitation of a major life activity 
on to a finding of impairment. "40 By defining major life activities in 
terms of the plaintiff's impairment, the Pacourek court's approach 
entirely collapses the definition of disability into a single impair­
ment component. In doing so, the Pacourek court's analysis disre­
gards the purpose of the ADA's three-component definition - to 
limit the Act's protections to those whose lives are deeply affected 
by their impairments, rather than including in its scope every per­
son with an impairment, regardless of that impairment's severity.41 
that a firefighter with asthma qualified as disabled because of his limited ability to breathe, 
but was not ''.otherwise qualified"); Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Socy., 625 F. Supp. 1180, 
1183-84 {S.D. Ohio 1985) {holding that "borderline" cerebral palsy was not a disability in 
circumstances in which it interfered only slightly with the plaintiff's ability to read and speak) 
with Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67 {D. Neb. 1993) {holding that a univer­
sity student with cerebral palsy who needed a wheelchair and a personal assistant was dis­
abled under the ADA). 
37. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. 
No. 101-116, at 22. Specifically, the EEOC instructs, 
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on 
the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that 
impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for partic­
ular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder, the 
presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling[,] or any 
number of other factors. 
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) {1991). The EEOC also notes, however, that "[o]ther impairments, 
such as IIlV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2{j). 
38. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A physical 
impairment, standing alone, is not necessarily a disability as contemplated by the ADA."); 
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 {4th Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress deliberately 
chose not to offer Rehabilitation Act coverage to everyone with an impairment). 
39. See Rauenhorst v. United States Dept. of Transp., 95 F.3d 715, 716 {8th Cir. 1996); 
Homeyer v. Stanley Turchin Assn., 91 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1996); Ennis v. National Assn. of 
Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 {4th Cir. 1995); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (Rehabilitation Act). But see EEOC Comp!. Man. {CCH) § 902.4 (ex­
plaining that some impairments are inherently substantially limiting); see also infra note 45 
(discussing per se disabilities). 
40. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 
F3d 1143 {5th Cir. 1996); see also Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 107 
(S.D. Iowa 1995), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). 
41. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) {"Many impairments do not impact an individual's life 
to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments."). 
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The ADA establishes no automatic categorical relationship be­
tween recognized impairments and recognized major life activities. 
The Pacourek court reasons that because the EEOC lists reproduc­
tive disorders as a type of impairment, it must have intended repro­
duction to be considered a major life activity.42 Most of the 
categories of impairment on the Congressional and EEOC lists,43 
however, lack corresponding major life activities. Sickle-cell ane­
mia, for example, is a hemic disorder constituting an impairment, 
but the ability to produce normal-shaped blood cells is not a major 
life activity. Rather, the determination as to whether an individual 
with sickle cell anemia is disabled depends on the effect of that im­
pairment on some other life activity, such as the ability to walk.44 
The inclusion of reproductive disorders in the list of example 
impairments signifies only a recognition that reproductive disorders 
may be serious enough to warrant ADA protection, not an ac­
knowledgment that all reproductive disorders automatically sub­
stantially limit a major life activity.45 Disorders of the reproductive 
system are similar to every other impairment on the EEOC list in 
terms of their relationship to major life activities. Like the other 
impairments, reproductive disorders may limit a whole host of ma­
jor life activities.46 The simultaneous recognition of reproductive 
disorders as impairments and exclusion of reproduction from every 
list of recognized major life activities47 is therefore consistent with 
Congressional and EEOC treatment of other impairments on their 
lists and in no way suggests that Congress intended reproductive 
impairments to constitute disabilities per se. 
42. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
43. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 
(1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989); see also supra note 27. 
44. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4(c) ex. 2. 
45. The EEOC has recognized some impairments to be disabilities per se, but it rarely 
does so, reserving this classification for impairments that are so severe that they are assumed 
to substantially limit major life activities without additional proof. Examples include legal 
blindness, deafness, and HlV infection. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4. Absent 
these very rare circumstances, however, an individual's impairment must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis to determine the extent to which it limits major life activities. See EEOC 
Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4 (describing as "very rare instances" the impairments that are so 
severe that they may constitute per se disabilities). 
46. For example, an ovarian tumor may limit a woman's ability to walk, see Ivey, supra 
note 14, at 28, menstrual disorders causing abnormal vaginal bleeding can interfere with 
work, see Robert E. Nesse, Abnormal Vaginal Bleeding in Perimenopausal Women, AM. FAM. 
PHYsrCIAN, July 1989, at 185, 185, and advanced syphilis can cause brain deterioration, mak­
ing it difficult for patients to concentrate, sleep, speak, or see, see MRoczKOWSKI, supra note 
14, at 197-200. 
47. See supra note 15 (listing the major life activities previously recognized by Congress 
or the EEOC). 
732 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:724 
II. THE LE G ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADA FAILS TO 
SUPPORT COVER AGE FOR PURELY 
REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS 
The legislative history of the ADA does not indicate that Con­
gress intended the ADA to include protection for individuals with 
purely reproductive disorders. Legislators did recognize that repro­
ductive disorders generally - that is, not only purely reproductive 
disorders - were "impairments" that could substantially limit ma­
jor life activities.48 Yet in the entirety of hearings, floor debates, 
and committee reports, no legislator ever referred to any purely re­
productive disorder as the type of condition that would substan­
tially limit any major life activity and that therefore should qualify 
under the ADA as a disability.49 
Although nothing in the legislative history advocates recogniz­
ing purely reproductive disorders as disabilities, the legislative his­
tory does include explicit and universal recognition that all 
individuals infected with IDV qualify as disabled.50 One legislative 
committee expressed a belief that substantial limitations on the 
ability of IDV-infected individuals to reproduce provide the basis 
for universal coverage of IDV, thereby implying that reproduction 
is a major life activity.51 The courts that have recognized infertility 
as a disability have relied heavily on these comments about IDV as 
support for their conclusion that reproduction constitutes a major 
life activity.52 
Section II.A asserts that it is improper to extrapolate from ADA 
coverage of IDV-positive individuals that the ADA also covers in­
dividuals with purely reproductive disorders. In fact, as section II.B 
points out, legislators consciously excluded reproduction from their 
48. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. 
No. 101-116, at 22. 
49. On the contrary, the only legislator who even mentioned a purely reproductive disor­
der said that the ADA should not be construed to grant automatic disability status to people 
infected with sexually transmitted diseases. See 136 CoNG. REc. E1774 (May 24, 1990) 
(statement of Rep. Craig) (noting with disapproval that anyone with a sexually transmitted 
disease would be disabled under the ADA if procreation and intimate sexual relations were 
major life activities). 
50. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18; S. 
REP. No. 101-116, at 22; see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
51. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 ("As noted by (a 1988 Department of Justice 
memorandum ] ... a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered 
under the first ... definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to 
procreation and intimate sexual relationships."); cf. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 
(citing the same memorandum for its conclusion that HIV-infected individuals are protected, 
but omitting the language about procreation and intimate sexual activity); S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 22 ("[A] person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under 
the first prong of the definition of the term 'disability.' "). 
52. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Erickson v. 
Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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lists of sample major life activities, an omission that provides strong 
support for the inference that Congress did not intend reproduction 
to be considered a major life activity. 
A. The Basis for ADA Protection of HIV-Positive Individuals 
Does Not Support ADA Coverage of Purely 
Reproductive Disorders 
Congress and the administrative agencies charged with enforc­
ing the ADA have unanimously accepted that the ADA protects all 
IDV-positive individuals. Unambiguous statements in Senate and 
House Committee Reports,s3 as well as numerous statements made 
during debate on the fioor,s4 demonstrate a widespread under­
standing throughout Congress that all IDV-positive individuals 
would be individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Based on 
this understanding, the administrative agencies charged with en­
forcing the ADA all consider IDV-infected individuals to be indi­
viduals with disabilities.ss 
Despite the widespread agreement that the Act considers all 
IDV-infected individuals as individuals with disabilities, there is 
some dispute as to the proper basis for that conclusion. This section 
describes and evaluates two independent bases that have been of­
fered to explain ADA coverage of all IDV-positive individuals. 
Section II.A.1 considers and rejects the view that the ADA covers 
IDV-positive individuals because IIlV limits reproduction, which is 
53. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (concluding that HIV-positive individuals are 
disabled under first definition (citing Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assis­
tant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culverhouse, Jr., Counsel to 
the President (Sept. 27, 1988), 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA), No. 641, 405:1 [hereinafter 
Kmiec Memorandum])); H.R. REP. No.101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, 
at 22 (same). 
54. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. REc. S9696 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 136 
CoNG. REc. H4621 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) ("[W]ith the adoption of 
this act we are instantaneously going to bring within the definition of disabled person . . .  
every HIV carrier in America, every person with AIDS. "); 136 CoNG. REc. H2626 (May 22, 
1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott); 136 CONG. REc. 10872 (statement of Rep. Weiss) 
(May 17, 1990) ("Once the ADA becomes law, all persons with HIV disease will finally be 
protected in private employment."); 135 CONG. REc. 19812-13 (Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of 
Sen. Cranston) ("[T]his bill covers individuals with AIDS and individuals who are infected 
with the HIV virus . • . .  [P]eople with AIDS and those who are infected with the virus are 
covered under the first prong of the definition of disability as people with impairments that 
substantially limit major life activities."). 
55. The EEOC instructs that disability status generally should be determined on a case­
by-case basis. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.4(c)(1) (1993). Some impairments, 
however, are so inherently disabling that they constitute per se disabilities. HIV infection, 
the EEOC concludes, is "inherently substantially limiting." EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 
§ 902.4(c)(1); see also Federal Contract Compliance Manual App. 6D, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Man. (BNA) No. 770, at 405:351, as amended Nov. 21, 1994 (Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs); Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Serv­
ices, to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (May 1, 1990), in 136 
CoNG. REc. S9539 (July 11, 1990) (Health and Human Services); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996) 
(DOJ). 
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a major life activity. Section II.A.2 argues that Congress instead 
adopted what can be called the one-disease view, which justifies 
ADA coverage on the basis that the full course of HIV, from infec­
tion to the onset and development of AIDS, is one disease that in­
evitably and invariably affects nonreproductive major life activities. 
Tiris section concludes that ADA coverage of HIV fails to support 
the claim that reproduction is a major life activity. 
1. Limitations on Reproduction Fail to Explain ADA 
Coverage of All HIV-Positive Individuals 
IIlV does not affect the reproductive capabilities of every in­
fected individual. Therefore, the belief that the ADA covers HIV­
positive individuals because HIV limits their reproductive capabili­
ties is improper. Tiris "substantially limits reproduction" view is 
based on a statement in a 1988 Department of Justice memorandum 
which offered the first authoritative legal opinion that HIV infec­
tion constituted a disability at all.56 Written shortly after the 
Supreme Court's decision in School Board v. Arline,51 the memo­
randum sought to answer a question left expressly unanswered by 
the Supreme Court: whether IIlV-infected individuals meet the 
Rehabilitation Act's definition of an "individual with handicaps. "58 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas Kmiec concluded that 
all IIlV-positive individuals, symptomatic and asymptomatic, qual­
ify as "handicapped individuals."59 In reaching his conclusion, 
.Kmiec noted that HIV-positive individuals face substantial limita­
tions on their ability to reproduce and to engage in intimate sexual 
relations. 60 
Although Congress adopted the Kmiec Memorandum's conclu­
sion that IIlV-positive individuals are individuals wiith disabilities 
under the Rehabilitation Act,61 the legislative history of the ADA 
indicates that Congress did not support the memorandum's analysis 
as a proper explanation for extending ADA coverage to all HIV­
positive individuals. First, only one Congressional committee re­
port, that of the House Committee on Education and Labor, relied 
56. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:1-2. 
57. 480 U.S. 273 {1987). 
58. See 480 U.S. at 282 n.7 ("(We] do not reach the questions whether a carrier of a 
contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or 
whether such person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handi­
capped person as defined by the (Rehabilitation] Act."). 
59. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:11. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act uses as its definition of "disability" the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped." 
See supra note 11. 
60. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 53, at 405:6-7. Kmiec also asserted that "[t]here 
is little doubt that procreation is a major life activity." Id. at 405:7. This additional assertion 
has not been universally accepted, however. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67, 72-75. 
61. See supra notes 53-54. 
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on Kmiec's underlying analysis as support for universal coverage of 
HIV.62 Viewed in the context of the committee report as a whole, 
however, the manner in which the committee cited the Memoran­
dum suggests support only for the concept of universal HIV cover­
age, and not for the idea that reproduction is a major life activity. 
Furthermore, a· mere two sentences prior to the Kmiec reference, 
the committee provided a list of activities that qualify as major life 
activities.63 Reproduction is absent from that list.64 Had the com­
mittee truly intended to adopt Kmiec's analysis, it would have in­
cluded reproduction as a major life activity. It simply does not 
make sense to conclude that the committee sincerely intended re­
production to be considered a major life activity when it failed to 
include reproduction in its list of illustrative major life activities just 
two sentences earlier. 
Second, although the House Committee on the Judiciary and 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources both cite 
the Kmiec Memorandum, they do so only for its conclusion, making 
no reference to reproduction as a major life activity.65 These com­
mittee reports also exclude reproduction from their lists of major 
life activities. 
Third, if Congress intended universal HIV coverage to be based 
on limitations to reproduction, there likely would have been addi­
tional discussion on the floor or in committee reports on other re­
productive disorders that the ADA would automatically classify as 
disabilities. In the entirety of legislative floor debates and commit­
tee reports, there was no discussion of the ADA's intended effect 
on any purely reproductive disorders. There is no evidence that 
Congress ever contemplated that the ADA would classify individu­
als with purely reproductive disorders as disabled. 
The most compelling evidence, however, that Congress did not 
intend reproductive limitations to provide the justification for uni­
versal HIV coverage is that this justification cannot fully explain 
universal HIV coverage. HIV infection does not affect the activity 
of reproduction for every HIV-positive individual. Significant num­
bers of HIV-positive individuals are unable to reproduce regardless 
of their HIV status. For example, surgically sterilized individuals 
who later contract HIV incur no reproductive limitations as a result 
62. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) ("As noted by [a 1988 DOJ memoran-
dum] . . a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the 
first . . . definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to procreation 
and intimate sexual relationships. "); cf. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (citing the 
same memorandum for its conclusion that HIV-infected individuals are protected but omit­
ting the language about procreation and intimate sexual activity); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22. 
63. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52. 
64. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt 2, at 52. 
65. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989). 
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of the infection. Similarly, postmenopausal women who contract 
HIV face no additional reproductive limitations as a result of HIV 
infection.66 Like those who have been surgically sterilized, they are 
unable to reproduce for reasons wholly unrelated to the disease. 
Nonetheless, Congress has expressed unambiguously its intent that 
all HIV-positive individuals be considered disabled under the Act.67 
Consequently, the dual assertions that HIV substantially limits re­
production and that reproduction is a major life activity cannot sat­
isfactorily explain universal ADA coverage of HIV-infected 
individuals. 
Another argument that should not be overlooked is that HIV is 
primarily a disorder of the immune system and does not necessarily 
limit the physical ability to reproduce at all. HIV-positive individu­
als often choose not to reproduce because of the risk that HIV will 
be transmitted to the child or that pregnancy may trigger or acceler­
ate the onset of a more active stage of AIDS.68 Nonetheless, many 
individuals with HIV can reproduce, and many who do reproduce 
will have children who are HIV-negative. 69 The fact that some 
HIV-positive individuals can and do reproduce indicates that HIV 
infection does not necessarily substantially limit its carriers' ability 
to reproduce. To the extent that HIV infection does not limit the 
reproductive capabilities, limitations on reproduction cannot be the 
reason why all HIV-positive individuals are considered disabled. 
2. Only the One-Disease Theory Adequately 
Explains Universal HIV Coverage 
Universal coverage of HIV-positive individuals, including those 
whose HIV status does not affect their reproductive capabilities, is 
better explained by what can be called the one-disease theory. Ac­
cording to the one-disease theory, HIV infection is the initial stage 
of a long-term disease that cannot be neatly compartmentalized 
into discrete periods but that clearly affects a broad spectrum of 
major life activities as it develops into full-blown AIDS. In a 1988 
letter to the Department of Justice, Surgeon General C. Everett 
Koop called HIV infection "the starting point of a single disease 
66. See, e.g., Robert W. Stock, When Older Women Get HIV, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1997, 
at Cl (observing that more than 2,500 cases of AIDS in women age sixty and older have been 
reported to the Centers for Disease Control). 
67. See supra notes 53-55. 
68. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1423-24, 1425 n.203. 
69. See id. at 1423-24 (stating that only one in three babies born to HIV-positive women 
will be born with the virus). For further analysis of whether the psychological aversion to 
sexual activity resulting from fear of spreading the virus can be considered "substantially 
limiting," see id. at 1421-28. 
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which progresses through a variable range of stages."70 As it pro­
gresses toward full-blown AIDS, HIV invariably limits almost all of 
the explicitly recognized major life activities.11 The one-disease 
theory not only represents the prevailing view of the medical com­
munity ,12 but also represents the approach of the Presidential Com­
mission on HIV73 as well as the predominant view among the 
legislators who passed the ADA.74 Various courts have followed 
this lead and have adopted the one-disease explanation as well.75 
The one-disease theory is also more consistent with the ADA's 
antidiscriminatory purpose. Because AIDS is a progressive disease, 
HIV infection will at some point substantially limit major life activi­
ties, even though it may not be known when that will occur - or, 
once it has occurred, when it began.76 Because there is no clear 
demarcation indicating the onset of the inevitable substantially lim­
iting stage of the disease, it is unrealistic to attempt to differentiate 
between the disabling and predisabling stages of the disease.77 In­
deed, any attempt to differentiate may actually permit discrimina­
tion against infected individuals before the onset of the 
substantially limiting stage. If the ADA did not protect all HIV­
positive individuals at all stages of the disease, for example, an em-
70. Letter from C. Everett Koop, M. D., Surgeon General, to Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General [hereinafter Koop Letter], in Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 
53, at 405:19. 
· 
71. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1410, 1420-21, 1428. 
72. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1398 (citing support from the Institute of Medicine and the 
Presidential Commission on HIV); Koop Letter, supra note 70, at 405:19. 
73. See REPORT OF TIIB PRESIDENITAL CoMMISSION ON TIIB ffiV EPIDEMIC at xvii (June 
24, 1988) (calling for a "full course" focus not isolating any one stage of the disease); see also 
Buss, supra note 11, at 1401 n.68. 
74. See 136 CoNG. REc. S9696 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) {"People with 
mv disease are individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of mv infection 
- asymptomatic IDV infection, symptomatic IDV infection or full-blown AIDS. These indi­
viduals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the A DA . . . .  
Although the major life activity that is affected at any point in the spectrum by the mv 
infection may be different, there is a substantial limitation of some major life activity from 
the onset of IDV infection."); 136 CoNG. REc. H4626 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Waxman) ("As medical knowledge has increased, specialists in the field increasingly recog­
nize that there exists a continuum of disease among those who are IDV infected. All such 
individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the A DA."); see 
also 136 CoNG. REc. H4623 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); 136 CoNG. REc. 
11,453-54 (May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Mc Dermott). 
75. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that scientists 
consider AIDS to be a "continuum of disease"); cf. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 
F. Supp. 102, 107 n3 (S. D. Iowa 1995) (noting that the reasons for granting disability status 
to IDV are distinguishable from the reasons for protecting purely reproductive disorders 
because IDV can limit many of the acknowledged major life activities), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th 
Cir. 1996); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. 
Supp. 120, 132 (N. D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that prejudice against IDV-positive individuals cur­
tails their ability to perform a variety of major life activities). 
76. See Buss, supra note 11, at 1419-20. 
77. See id. 
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ployer might be encouraged to discriminate against an HIV-positive 
employee in the early stages of the disease - before the HIV 
progressed to the point at which it would substantially limit major 
life activities.78 By protecting all HIV-positive individuals at all 
stages of the disease, the ADA avoids creating such an incentive for 
employers to discriminate in the early stages of HIV, before it is 
"too late." As a result, HIV-positive individuals at any stage of the 
disease should be treated as sharing the characteristics of those with 
more clinically advanced AIDS and, accordingly, as having an im­
pairment that substantially limits major life activities. 
The one-disease theory, therefore, provides the soundest and 
most well-supported explanation for Congress's clear intent that the 
ADA cover as disabled all HIV-positive individuals. Only under 
the one-disease theory does every HIV-positive individual, sympto­
matic and asymptomatic, sterile and fertile, meet the Act's defini­
tion of disability.79 
B. Congress Excluded Reproduction from the 
List of Major Life Activities 
More conclusive evidence of legislative intent can be found in 
the lists of illustrative major life activities created by the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, the House Committee on Education 
and Labor, and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re­
sources. Each of these three committees failed to include reproduc­
tion in its list of illustrative major life activities.80 The interpretive 
guidelines of both the EEOC and the Department of Justice also 
omit reproduction from their lists of major life activities.81 
Although none of these lists of major life activities purports to 
be exhaustive, the failure to include reproduction is not likely to 
have been mere oversight. First, legislative references to the Kmiec 
memorandum at least raise the possibility that some members of 
Congress believed that the ADA's coverage of HIV stemmed from 
limitations on reproduction.82 In light of these references in the 
78. See id. at 1420. 
79. Although asymptomatic sterilized or postmenopausal individuals with HIV might 
meet the ADA's second or third definitions of disability, legislators agreed that all HIV­
infected individuals are covered under the ADA's first definition of disability. See H.R. REP. 
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990); S. REP. No. 
101-116, at 22 (1989); supra notes 53-55. 
80. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22; cf. H.R. REP. No. 
101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (excluding reproduction from its list of major life activities but also citing 
the Kmiec Memorandum's statement that limitations on procreation qualify HIV as a 
disability). 
81. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996) (DOJ); 29 C. F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996) (EEOC). 
82. See supra note 51. At a minimum, legislative references to the Kmiec Memorandum 
indicate that legislators were familiar with the Memorandum and its analysis, even if they 
chose to adopt only the Memorandum's conclusion. 
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legislative history, the decisions of the various Congressional com­
mittees, the EEOC, and the Department of Justice to exclude re­
production from their lists of major life activities provide powerful 
evidence that any push to include reproduction as an acknowledged 
major life activity was a minority effort. Second, Congress, the 
EEOC, and the Department of Justice clearly contemplated the 
role of reproductive disorders in the Act's definitional scheme be­
cause reproductive disorders are included in every list of sample 
impairments. 83 Had Congress intended to include reproduction 
among major life activities, it certainly had the opportunity to do 
so. The inclusion of reproductive disorders among impairments 
and the simultaneous exclusion of reproduction as a named major 
life activity strongly suggest that Congress did not intend reproduc­
tion to constitute a major life activity. Finally, the only legislator 
even to address the role of purely reproductive disorders under the 
ADA concluded that such disorders should not constitute auto­
matic disabilities.84 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the 
part of the legislative history that suggests that some members of 
Congress believed reproduction to be a major life activity is that 
some members of Congress believed reproduction to be a major life 
activity.85 
ill. REPRODUCTION LACKS THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS 
O F  A MAfoR LIFE ACTIVITY 
Neither the ADA itself nor the EEOC's interpretive guidelines 
define the phrase "major life activity." Instead, the EEOC merely 
offers examples of functions that constitute major life activities, fur­
ther cautioning that this list is not exhaustive.86 Additionally, the 
EEOC provides only vague guidelines for determining whether an 
unlisted activity should qualify.87 This Part examines the statutory 
and administrative guidelines that define which types of activities 
constitute "major life activities" and concludes that reproduction 
falls outside these guidelines. Section ID.A argues that three char­
acteristics - microfrequency, macrofrequency, and universality -
are common to all previously recognized major life activities and 
should be explicitly recognized as necessary elements of a major life 
activity. Section ID.B concludes that in terms of microfrequency, 
83. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28; S. REP. 
No. 101-116, at 22; 28 C. F.R. § 36.104 (1996) (DOJ); 29 C. F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l) (EEOC). 
84. See supra note 49. 
85. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 107 (S.D. Iowa 1995), atfd., 
95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). 
86. 29 C. F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). 
87. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (describing "major life activities " in terms of "basic 
activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no 
difficulty "). 
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macrofrequency, and universality, reproduction is qualitatively dif­
ferent from previously recognized major life activities. As a result, 
reproduction cannot be considered a major life activity under the 
ADA. Purely reproductive disorders, therefore, do not substan­
tially limit a major life activity and are not disabilities under the 
ADA. 
A. The Frequency-Universality Test Identifies Three Necessary 
Elements of a Major Life Activity 
Although no clear statutory or administrative mandate defines 
the necessary components of a major life activity, the EEOC has 
provided some guidance by expressly recognizing sixteen activities 
as major life activities. Nine of these activities are codified in the 
federal regulations, four appear in the appendix to the codified reg­
ulations, and three appear in the EEOC Compliance Manual. Ac­
cording to federal regulations, major life activities include 
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work­
ing."88 This codified list matches the lists of major life activities 
promulgated in the House and Senate Committee Reports recom­
mending passage of the bill.89 In an appendix to this list, the EEOC 
also includes sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching among major life 
activities.90 Although not codified with the other examples, the 
EEOC Compliance Manual lists "[m]ental and emotional processes 
such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others" as ad­
ditional examples of major life activities.91 Courts have also recog­
nized these additional activities as major life activities.92 The only 
other guidance offered by the EEOC is the general statement that 
major life activities are "those basic activities that the average per-
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). 
89. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 
(1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989). Tue House Committee on Education and Labor 
also included "participation in community activities" in its list. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, 
at 52 (1990). Although this specific language is not included in the EEOC Regulations codi­
fied in Title 29, the EEOC Compliance Manual does recognize "interacting with others" as a 
major life activity. EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.3(b) (1993). 
90. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). 
91. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.3(b). 
92. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., No. CV-94-N-0475-S, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6020, at *18 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (declining to hold as a matter of law that 
concentrating is not a major life activity); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. 
Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that interaction with 
others is a major life activity); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Ill. 
1989) (same); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 
1988) (same). 
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son in the general population can perform with little or no 
difficulty. "93 
Although neither the EEOC nor Congress provides criteria nec­
essary for identifying a major life activity, the major life activities 
they have already recognized share three common characteristics. 
Explicit recognition of these characteristics as necessary compo­
nents of a major life activity would provide the courts with much­
needed guidance, limiting conflicts among jurisdictions and provid­
ing increased predictability in ADA enforcement. As a result, this 
Note advocates the express recognition of the following three­
element Frequency-Universality Test.94 To merit consideration as a 
major life activity under this test, an activity must be performed: 
(1) with microfrequency: repeatedly throughout the day, if the 
activity is brief in duration, or for a large portion of the day, if the 
activity is of longer duration; 
(2) with macrofrequency: every day or nearly every day;95 and 
93. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(i). This Note will refer to this instruction as the little difficulty 
standard. 
94. The elements of this test are adapted from the decisions in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist 
Medical Center, 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996), 
and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), affd., 79 F.3d 
1143 (5th Cir. 1996). The test tightens the "throughout the day, day in and day out" language 
from these decisions and recasts them in terms of microfrequency and macrofrequency. The 
universality element is adapted from a footnote in Krauel that observes: "Some people 
choose not to have children, but all people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, 
see, hear, breathe, learn, and work, unless a handicap or illness prevents them from doing 
so." Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 n.1. 
95. "Nearly every day" means nearly every day, not three or four times a week. "Nearly" 
is used only to acknowledge that there may be unusual or rare circumstances in which some­
one without an impairment would not perform a major life activity for a day. For example, 
the fact that someone without an impairment might choose not to speak for one full day 
would not foreclose a showing of macrofrequency. 
One commentator argued against the adoption of a frequency criterion, claiming, 
"Although it is certainly true that most people engage in the activities of walking and breath­
ing more frequently than they engage in reproduction, the same cannot be said of other 
activities on the list, such as manual tasks or caring for others." Katie Cook Morgan, Com­
ment, Should Infertility Be a Covered Disability Under the ADA?: A Question for Congress, 
Not the Courts, 65 CIN. L. REv. 963, 981 (1997). The argument that most people reproduce 
more frequently than they perform manual tasks or care for others may be true in some 
brothels but certainly nowhere else. "Manual taks," by definition, include any tasks per­
formed with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times 
throughout the day, every day. "Manual tasks," by definition, include any tasks performed 
with the hands. Without question, people not disabled use their hands many times through­
out the day, every day. "Caring for others" is not even an enumerated major life activity. 
The author apparently confuses this activity with the enumerated major life activities of "car­
ing for oneself' and "interacting with others." It would strain credibility to argue that people 
do not care for themselves or interact with others repeatedly throughout the day, every day 
or nearly every day. 
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(3) universally: by nearly all persons, except those who are pre­
vented from performing the activity by an AD A-defined 
"impairment. "96 
All of the sixteen previously recognized major life activities -
with the exception of "working," which is discussed immediately 
below - satisfy these three threshold criteria. This Note does not 
address whether these three criteria are sufficient for qualification 
as a major life activity. This Note merely argues that the three ele­
ments of the Frequency-Universality Test are necessary prerequi­
sites for qualification as a major life activity. 
Working does not fit the Frequency-Universality Test, but Con­
gress and the EEOC have clearly indicated their intent that work­
ing be treated differently from the other major life activities. 
Unlike their treatment of the other listed activities, Congress and 
the EEOC have established specific criteria for courts to consider in 
determining whether an impairment substantially limits the activity 
of working.97 Congress and the EEOC specifically call for courts, to 
evaluate separately limitations on working because these limita­
tions are inherently more difficult to define.98 Congress further 
96. Again, "nearly" is used to acknowledge that there are rare and unusual circumstances 
in which some people would not participate in a major life activity on a certain day. For 
example, someone hiking alone in the mountains might not speak for a day, or a prisoner tied 
down might not stand for a day. However, these events are irrelevant in terms of the ADA's 
purpose of providing legal protection to disabled individuals who are denied equal participa· 
tion in American society. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a){2), (7), {8) {1994) (identifying as impe­
tuses to passage of the ADA Congress's findings that "society has tended to isolate and 
segregate individuals with disabilities," that discrimination against individuals with disabili­
ties denies them the ability to "participate in, and contribute to, society," and that "the Na­
tion's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities" include the assurance of "full 
participation" in society); see also 136 CoNG. REc. 10,872 {May 17, 1990) (remarks of Rep. 
Weiss) {"The ADA . . .  is long overdue legislation remedying the separatism which now 
excludes 43 million disabled citizens from equal participation in American society."). This 
statutory purpose presupposes that the individuals the Act aims to protect engage in a certain 
minimal level of normal social interaction. Tue existence of a few extreme or unusual 
counterfactual examples of people isolated from society will not foreclose a showing of 
universality, precisely because neither the Act nor the universality element is meant to pro­
tect individuals isolated from the general population. 
Interpretive guidance provided by the EEOC supports the use of a "nearly all people" 
standard instead of a standard purporting to account for "all people." Tue little difficulty 
standard advises, " 'Major life activities' are those basic activities that the average person in 
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) 
{1996) (emphasis added). 
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20){3); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20); EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH) 
§ 902.4(c) {1995); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt 3, at 29 {1990). Tue EEOC instructs that "the 
determination of whether a person's impairment is substantially limiting should first address 
major life activities other than working." EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH) § 902.4{c). For exam­
ple, if an individual's arthritis substantially limits that person's ability to walk (as compared 
to the average person in the general population), then the person is substantially limited in 
the major life activity of walking. Tue court should consider whether the arthritis substan­
tially limits the person's ability to work only if it is unclear whether the arthritis is severe 
enough to substantially limit walking or other major life activities. See EEOC Compl. Man. 
{CCH) § 902.4(c). 
98. See EEOC Compl. Man. {CCH) § 902.4{c); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29. 
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evinced its intent to provide special protection to those who partici­
pate in the activity of working by enacting Title I of the ADA, 
which specifically targets discrimination in employment.99 None of 
the other fifteen recognized major life activities is given such 
unique and explicit emphasis in the ADA, and each of these re­
maining fifteen recognized major life. actitjties are performed 
microfrequently, macrofreque;ntly, and universally. 
Although no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted this Frequency­
Universality Test, numerous courts have employed its elements in 
making determinations regarding ADA coverage.100 These courts 
have refused to recognize as a major life activity any function that 
lacks any of the three components of the test. For example, courts 
have held that participation in recreational sports is not a major life 
activity.1°1 Participation in sports fails the test because not all peo­
ple participate in sports. Although some people - professional 
athletes, for example - may participate in sports for a large por­
tion of the day, every day, participation in sports must fail the 
universality test because unimpaired people commonly choose not 
to participate in sports.102 Similarly, air travel has been held not to 
constitute a major life activity because people do not engage in air 
travel with the same frequency or universality with which they en­
gage in the expressly recognized major life activities.103 Like partic­
ipation in sports, air travel fails the test. 
99. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (stating that Title I provides a "critical protec­
tion" against job discrimination). 
100. See infra notes 101-05. 
101. See, e.g., Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); Scharff v. 
Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D. Ohio "1991) (holdit}g, without further analysis, that 
"[t]he plaintiff's inability to engage in competitive sporting events and other unusually de­
manding physical activities did not constitute a substantial impairment of the plaintiff's major 
life activities"). Some courts have held, however, that the inability to participate in inter­
scholastic sports can limit substantially the major life activity of learning. See Pahulu v. Uni­
versity of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that interscholastic sports 
can involve learning how to a be part of a team, but that the plaintiff's inability to play on the 
team did not substantially limit his ability to learn because a myriad of educational opportu­
nities remained available at the plaintiff's college); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic 
Assn., 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The fact that interscholastic sports are not per­
formed by everybody every day means only that interscholastic sports cannot constitute a 
major life activity per se; the courts that have considered the inability to participate in inter­
scholastic sports a disability have done so only when they have also concluded that the inabil­
ity to participate substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to learn in general. See, e.g., 
Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 489 (finding that because participation on the track team helped 
the plaintiff retain the discipline he needed in order to study more effectively in school, the 
plaintiff's inability to participate substantially limited his ability to learn). 
102. See Knapp, 101 F.3d 473, 480 (pointing out that universality is absent, as "[n]ot eve­
ryone gets to go to college, let alone play intercollegiate sports"). 
103. See Schultz v. Spraylat Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (interpreting 
"major life activity" under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act to exclude air 
travel because of its infrequency in comparison with the commonness of breathing, which is a 
major life activity). California's Fair Employment and Housing Act defines disability and 
major life activity in substantially the same terms as the ADA. See CAL. Govr. ConE 
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On the other hand, courts uniformly have accepted sleep as a 
major life activity.104 Sleep satisfies all three elements. It satisfies 
the microfrequency element because it is performed for several 
hours a day; the macrofrequency element because it is performed 
every day - or at least nearly every day, if we acknowledge the 
occasional all-nighter; and the universality element because it is 
performed by all people. Similarly, courts have found eating to be a 
major life activity.105 Eating satisfies the microfrequency element 
because it is performed repeatedly throughout the day; the 
macrofrequency element because it is performed every day or 
nearly every day; and the universality element because it is per­
formed by all people. 
B. Reproduction Lacks the Necessary Characteristics 
of a Major Life Activity 
lbis section considers three approaches courts have taken in 
evaluating reproduction as a purported major life activity and ex­
amines how these approaches relate to the Frequency-Universality 
Test. As section ID.B.1 elaborates, some courts implicitly have 
adopted all three components of the test as minimally necessary cri­
teria for a major life activity and have concluded that reproduction 
does not satisfy these criteria. Other courts, described in section 
m.B.2, implicitly have adopted the frequency components106 of the 
test and have attempted to redefine reproduction in terms of more 
frequent events like ovulation and sperm production so that it 
meets the microfrequency and macrofrequency criteria. Finally, 
section III.B.3 explains how some courts have rejected the fre­
quency components as too narrowly drawn, instead holding that re­
production should be a major life activity because of its 
momentousness as a lifetime event. lbis section concludes that 
only the first of these three approaches preserves the proper mean­
ing of the statute. 
§ 12926(k)(l) (West 1994) (defining disability); CAL. CODE REos. tit. 2, § 7293.6 (1994) (de­
fining major life activity). 
104. See Mendez v. Gearan, No. C 95-4075, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1594, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 13, 1997) (considering frequency and universality by describing sleep as "integral to the 
average person's daily existence"); Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 814 (N.D. 
Tex. 1994) (stating, in denying summary judgment for defendant, that "[p]laintiff's disease . • •  
affect[s] such major life activities as . . .  sleeping"); see also Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 
No. CV-94-N-0475-S, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6020, at *18 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) (holding 
that the ADA list does not preclude inclusion of sleep as a major life activity). 
105. See, e.g., Coghlan, 851 F. Supp. at 814 (stating without explanation that eating and 
sleeping are major life activities); Weiler v. Household Fm. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7825, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1994) (same). 
106. The "frequency components" are microfrequency and macrofrequency. These 
courts were silent as to the universality element. 
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1. Judicial Approach 1: Adopt the Frequency and 
Universality Criteria and Reject Reproduction 
as a Major Life Activity 
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Courts in at least two jurisdictions implicitly have applied the 
criteria of the Frequency-Universality Test to reject reproduction as 
a major life activity.107 Only this approach effectively preserves the 
language of the statute without judicially enlarging the scope of a 
"major life activity" as set forth by Congress and the EEOC. Like 
air travel or participation in sports, reproduction is an activity quali­
tatively different from the other activities on the EEOC list. In 
sharp contrast to the frequency with which people care for them­
selves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and 
learn, reproduction does not occur every day or nearly every day, 
nor repeatedly throughout the day or for a large portion of the 
day.1os Most individuals who reproduce do so only a few times in 
their lives; the human gestation period places physical restraints on 
the frequency with which people can reproduce. Absent a multiple 
birth, a person simply cannot reproduce on more than one or two 
occasions per year. A far cry from "nearly every day," a full nine 
months must pass between complete and successful reproductive 
ventures.1°9 Noting the infrequency of reproduction relative to the 
previously recognized major life activities, the court in Krauel v. 
Iowa Methodist Medical Center observed that "a person is not 
called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day."110 In 
fact, most courts that have found reproduction to be a major life 
activity have conceded that reproduction lacks the frequency ele­
ments that help comprise the test. They instead justify classification 
of reproduction as a major life activity by rejecting the test.111 
107. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-07 & n.1 (S.D. Iowa 
1995) (applying the frequency components by pointing out that people do not reproduce 
"throughout the day, day in and day out "; also applying the universality component by con­
trasting reproduction, an activity in which some people choose not to engage, with walking, 
seeing, and other activities, which are performed by all unimpaired people), affd., 95 F.3d 674 
{8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) 
{applying the frequency components by pointing out that, unlike the frequency with which 
people participate in previously recognized major life activities, people do not reproduce 
"throughout the day, day in and day out "), affd., 79 F.3d 1143 {5th Cir. 1996). 
108. See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106-07 & n.1; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243. 
109. A successful reproductive venture, of course, must include a birth. The length of the 
gestation period requires the passage of approximately nine months between births. There­
fore, the activity of reproduction cannot be completed more frequently than once every nine 
months or so. 
110. Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 (quoting Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243). 
111. See infra section III.B.3 {describing the approach of courts that reject the frequency 
criteria and embrace reproduction as a major life activity). But cf. section III.B.2 (describing 
the approach of courts that adopt the frequency criteria but attempt to redefine reproduction 
in terms of more frequent events so that reproduction fits within the frequency criteria). 
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Reproduction also fails to satisfy the universality component of 
the test. Unlike every illustrative major life activity set forth by 
Congress and the EEOC,112 reproduction is a lifestyle choice be­
cause many people consciously decline to participate in this activity, 
even though they have no impairment that prevents their participa­
tion. In contrast, activities that are performed universally are per­
formed by nearly all people, unless an impairment prevents their 
participation. 
Some courts that classify reproduction as a major life activity 
reject the notion that reproduction is a lifestyle choice. Instead, 
these courts call reproduction "an integral part of life," noting that 
without it, "none of us, nor any living thing, would exist."113 This 
argument, though it may have a certain sentimental appeal, ignores 
the common elements shared by previously recognized major life 
activities. All members of society care for themselves, perform 
manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, and learn unless an 
impairment prevents them from doing so.114 Many people, on the 
other hand, choose not to have children, despite having the capabil­
ity to reproduce in a healthy manner. 
Another court held that to call reproduction a lifestyle choice 
was nothing more than an exercise in semantics because certain 
other major life activities - speaking, for example - are choices as 
well.115 It is certainly true that some of the previously recognized 
major life activities have a volitional element, but it is also irrele­
vant. The argument that reproduction is a lifestyle choice does not 
fail merely because other recognized major life activities are voli­
tional. There is still a universe of difference between the number of 
people that speak and the number that reproduce. Speaking is an 
activity engaged in by all or nearly all people, unless an impairment 
prevents them from doing so. Unlike the other previously recog­
nized majc;>r life activities, many people capable of reproducing sim­
ply choose not to reproduce.116 The difference is qualitative, not 
merely quantitative. The previously recognized major life activities 
share the characteristic of being performed by nearly every 
unimpaired person on the planet. The activity of reproduction does 
not share that quality. 
Not only is reproduction a lifestyle choice that many people 
consciously decline, but · those who attempt or desire it often en-
112. Working, to which Congress gave special attention, is a unique, rather than an illus-
trative, example of a major life activity. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
113. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. III. 1996). 
114. See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106-07 & n.1. 
115. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997). 
116. See Kraue� 915 F. Supp. at 106 n.1 ("Some people choose not to have children, but 
all people [perform the other recognized major life activities]."). 
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counter significant difficulties. According to the interpretive guide­
lines to the ADA, "'major life activities' are those basic activities 
that the average person in the general population can perform with 
little or no difficulty."117 It can hardly be said that the average per­
son in the general population can reproduce with little or no diffi­
culty; many people are too young to reproduce, and many women 
are too old. Age, however, is not an automatic physical impedi­
ment to performing any of the major life activities the EEOC has 
explicitly recognized. The fact that a significant number of people 
are physically incapable of reproducing makes reproduction differ­
ent from every previously acknowledged major life activity. Fur­
ther, many people are neither too young nor too old to reproduce, 
but lack a partner.118 Finally, many people who have a partner fail 
to reproduce when they have heterosexual intercourse simply be­
cause of the odds against conception, even by a male and female 
with no reproductive impairments.119 Because it fails both the 
Frequency-Universality Test and the little difficulty standard, repro­
duction lacks the characteristics common to the other major life ac­
tivities, and judges therefore should not add it to the list. 
2. Judicial Approach 2: Adopt the Frequency Components, 
and Try to Make Reproduction Fit 
Some courts classifying reproduction as a major life activity 
have not rejected the frequency components embraced by the test; 
rather they have attempted to squeeze the square peg of reproduc­
tion into the round holes of micro- and macrofrequency by redefin­
ing reproduction in terms of more frequent events.12° Courts in 
jurisdictions following this "redefining" approach have dealt with 
the frequency component by contending that reproduction should 
not be viewed in terms of conception and childbirth alone. Rather, 
they argue, reproduction should be evaluated in terms of "the 
processes that occur continually in both male and female reproduc-
117. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (1991). 
118. Artificial insemination may solve this problem, but this complicated and expensive 
ordeal can hardly be characterized as something the "average person in the general popula-
tion" can do "with little or no difficulty." 
' 
119. The monthly fecundity (conception rate) in normal couples ranges from approxi­
mately 20 to 25 percent. See Talbert, supra note 1, at 2. The conception rate is even lower in 
the first several months after use of oral contraception ceases. See id. 
One commentator argued that reproduction is an activity that "most persons in society 
can perform without difficulty" because "only 7.9% of the population of persons of reproduc­
tive age have difficulty reproducing." Morgan, supra note 95, at 981 & n. 123. Drawing such 
a conclusion from this statistic ignores the statistic's critical qualifier, "of reproductive age." 
Morgan's conclusion is unpersuasive because it fails to consider the fact that many people are 
either too young or too old to reproduce. 
120. See Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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tive systems in order to achieve conception."121 The continual 
processes which allow reproduction include sperm production, ovu­
lation, and various hormonal changes. 
This Note contends that reproduction begins with conception 
and culminates at birth. These are the defining elements of the ac­
tivity, for unless both conception and birth occur, there can be no 
reproduction, and until the process of reproduction begins, there 
can be no conception and no birth. Several courts agree that this is 
the correct conceptualization.122 A broader notion of reproduction 
is inappropriate because instead of truly satisfying the test, it simply 
begs the question. Redefining reproduction in terms of sperm pro­
duction, ovulation, and other related processes merely identifies po­
tential areas of impairment, not major life activities. For example, 
in order for infrequent ovulation or impaired sperm production, 
which are ·undeniably "impairments" under the EEOC defini­
tion,123 to qualify as disabilities, they must still limit a major life 
activity.124 Infrequent ovulation and impaired sperm production 
limit no major life activities, however - unless either reproduction 
is a major life activity or sperm production and ovulation by them­
selves are major life activities. 
Using such a broad definition, reproduction might indeed satisfy 
the frequency components. Sperm production does occur through­
out the day, every day. The courts adopting this definition, how­
ever, ignore the equally important universality element, which 
undermines their position. Sperm production and ovulation fail the 
universality component of the test because all of these reproductive 
functions are unique to either males or females. Not one of the 
sixteen previously recognized major life activities are unique to one 
sex; on the contrary, every previously recognized major life activity 
is performed by everyone, or nearly everyone, regardless of sex.125 
It makes no sense to consider something a major life activity if half 
the population, or more, is precluded from ever performing it.126 
121. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 322. 
122. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1995) 
(describing reproduction as a "lifestyle choice" and an activity not performed with significant 
frequency, descriptions inconsistent with the notion that reproduction consists of involuntary 
bodily processes), affd., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 
F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (describing reproduction as less frequent than the recog­
nized major life activities), affd., 19 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996). 
123. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1991) (defining the impairment component of the three­
component definition of disability). 
124. See generally supra Part I; see also supra note 45 (explaining the infrequency with 
which impairments are labeled per se disabilities). 
125. See supra note 15. 
126. Critics may argue that sperm production and ovulation are parallel processes which 
might be labeled "gamete production." Grouping these processes under one label is not only 
inappropriate, but also does not change the fact that neither process passes the universality 
test. 
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Furthermore, a broad definition of reproduction is incompatible 
with the ADA's concept of a major life activity vis-a-vis its role in 
the ADA's three-part definition of disability. If the definition of 
reproduction were so broad as to include all the processes that lead 
to conception and childbirth, then to classify reproduction as a ma­
jor life activity would be to classify ovulation and sperm production 
by themselves as major life activities. Such a result would mean 
that a finding of disability would follow from the existence of only 
the first component of the three-component disability test - a re­
sult that would destroy the distinction between impairments and 
major life activities that the statute clearly seeks to preserve.121 
It is true, of course, that some courts have found these processes 
to constitute major life activities.128 Their analysis, however, lacks 
credibility because they have made this determination after consid­
ering only the "impairment" component of the definition of disabil­
ity, rather than considering "impairment" as only one of three 
necessary components.129 
The fact that male and female reproductive processes require entirely different organs, 
yield different products (eggs or sperm), and are unique and exclusive to half the population 
makes them different from every other previously recognized major life' activity. Major life 
activities such as seeing, breathing, and speaking are performed in exactly the same manner 
and through the use of the same body parts by each sex. Such a significant and obvious 
difference between gamete production and all other major life activities raises serious ques­
tions as to the validity of such a reclassification. No previously recognized major life activity 
attempts to group under one label activities with such significant distinctions. 
Nonetheless, even if male and female reproductive processes were grouped together, 
gamete production would still fail the universality test. At best, males and females as a group 
only engage in gamete production for a limited part of their lives. Neither males nor females 
engage in such processes before puberty, and although men may produce sperm for the dura­
tion of their lives, women undergo menopause, leaving them unable to engage in these repro­
ductive processes for half of their lives or more. Even if one were to accept the idea of 
"gamete production" as an activity not unique to either sex, a significant number of people 
will be unable to perform it {because of their age), despite the fact that no impairment pre­
vents performance. As a result, even gamete production cannot be classified as an activity 
performed by nearly all people. No other major life activity is possible for only a limited 
period during an individual's lifetime. 
127. See supra Part I. 
128. See, e.g., Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. ill. 1995). 
129. For example, in Erickson the court purported to consider the components of "im­
pairment" and "major life activity" separately. The Erickson court based its conclusion that 
reproduction is a major life activity on the fact that Mc Wright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 {7th 
Cir. 1992), found infertility to be a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act. See Erickson, 
911 F. Supp. at 322 (using the Mc Wright court's analysis to support a claim that reproduction 
is a major life activity). The McWright court, however, adopted as its definition of "individ­
ual with handicaps" the definition of "impairment," failing to consider the "major life activ­
ity" prong at all. See McWright, 982 F.2d at 226-27. Erickson cites McWright for the 
proposition that " 'the protected class of handicapped individuals . . .  include[s] any person 
with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system.' " Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 
322 (quoting McWright, 982 F.2d at 226-27). The Erickson court even concedes that the Mc­
Wright opinion failed to analyze explicitly the major life activity component, but the Erickson 
court then hypothesizes that Mc Wright must have contemplated that component. See Erick­
son, 911 F. Supp. at 322. The Mc Wright court should have contemplated the major life activ­
ity component, but it did not. Mc Wright reduced the definition of a "handicap" to the single 
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3. Judicial Approach 3: Reject the Frequency Criteria, 
Accept Reproduction as a Major Life Activity 
Some courts that have found reproduction to be a major life 
activity have rejected the frequency components offered in the 
Frequency-Universality Test, finding that neither the ADA nor its 
regulations overtly establish such criteria.130 They hold that the fre­
quency components too narrowly define "major life activity." In­
stead, they extend the definition of "major life activity" to include 
activities that are less frequent but "momentous" or a "fundamen­
tal aspect[ ] of human life."131 The criticism these courts direct to­
ward the frequency components of the Frequency-Universality Test, 
however, is more effectively directed at their own notion of a major 
life activity. It is true that nowhere in the ADA or its interpretive 
guidelines did Congress or the EEOC explicitly instruct that 
microfrequency and macrofrequency are necessary elements of a 
major life activity. It is equally true, however, that nowhere in the 
ADA or its interpretive guidelines is there any hint that infrequent 
but "momentous" or "significant" events constitute major life activ­
ities either. In fact, the only guidance Congress and the EEOC 
have provided - the illustrative lists and the little-difficulty stan­
dard132 - suggests that infrequent but momentous events are not 
major life activities. Not a single one of the illustrative major life 
activities can be described as infrequent but momentous. On the 
other hand, every illustrative major life activity approved by Con­
gress or the EEOC is performed microfrequently - repeatedly 
throughout the day or for a large portion of the day - and 
macrofrequently - every day or nearly every day. The inclusion of 
a "momentous ·event" category in the notion of a "major life activ­
ity" is nothing more than a judicial expansion of the law. Not only 
is momentousness a criterion inconsistent with every major life ac-
component of an "impairment." See Mc Wright, 983 F.2d at 226-27. The Mc Wright decision is 
entirely devoid of any "major life activity" analysis; the opinion does not even contain the 
phrase "major life activity." As a result, the Erickson court's reliance on McWright to sup­
port the conclusion that reproductive processes are major life activities is unpersuasive. 
130. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1997); Soodman v. 
Wiidman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, at *16-*17 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997). 
131. E.g., Lally v. Co=onwealth Edison Co., No. 95-C-4220, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19386, at *34-*35 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) ("The definition of major life activity should be 
construed broadly to include not only those activities necessary for daily existence, but also 
those actions which are momentous and fundamental aspects of human life."); Pacourek v. 
Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing the "momentousness" of repro­
duction, calling it "one of life's most significant moments"); see also Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941 
("Reproduction . • .  constitutes a major life activity because of its singular importance to 
those who engage in it."). 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93 
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tivity previously recognized by Congress or the EEOC, it is also 
hopelessly vague as a standard to apply to specific activities.133 
IV. OTHER STATUTES PROVIDE MORE APPROPRIATE 
MEANS OF RELIEF 
Any attempt to classify reproduction as a major life activity 
under the ADA strains the language of the Act and distorts its 
meaning. Not only is such a strain inappropriate, but it is also un­
necessary. Courts that have classified purely reproductive disorders 
as disabilities under the ADA undoubtedly were motivated by the 
laudable desire to allow relief for plaintiffs suffering discrimination 
relating to a reproductive disorder. As this Part elaborates, how­
ever, another means of relief for victims of reproductive discrimina­
tion already exists in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).134 
The PDA, a 1978 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, provides a more appropriate avenue for remedying dis­
crimination against women with reproductive disorders. The PDA 
declares that discrimination "because of or on the basis of preg­
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" constitutes sex­
based discrimination in violation of Title 'VII.135 The Supreme 
Court has held that discrimination based on the potential for preg­
nancy also constitutes sex discrimination under the PDA.136 Lower 
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, holding specifically 
that purely reproductive disorders constitute "related medical con­
ditions" under the language of the PDA.137 
Moreover, interpreting the PDA to cover discrimination against 
women with reproductive disorders most clearly effectuates its pur­
pose. In enacting the PDA, Congress sought to prohibit discrimina-
133. One commentator advances the similarly flawed argument that reproduction must 
be a major life activity because it has been deemed a fundamental right. See Morgan, supra 
note 95, at 982 ("Refusing to recognize reproduction as a major life activity is difficult to 
reconcile with the courts' long history of recognizing reproduction as a fundamental right."). 
The characterization of an activity as a fundamental right has no relationship whatsoever to 
whether the activity meets the ADA definition of a major life activity. Morgan's argument is 
unpersuasive for the same reasons that the "momentousness" argument is unpersuasive. See 
supra text accompanying notes 130-32. 
134. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 stat. 2076, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). 
136. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991). 
137. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402-03 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(holding that infertility is a "medical condition related to pregnancy and childbirth for pur­
poses of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act"); Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 
316, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that infertility is a pregnancy-related condition afforded 
protection under the PDA). But see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that infertility is not a "related medical condition" because it pre­
vents conception, unlike pregnancy and childbirth which occur after conception). 
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tion on the basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant.138 One 
would expect claims of discrimination against infertile women to 
arise most often when infertile women seek treatment for their con­
dition. Discriminating against a female employee for seeking to 
correct an infertility problem is discriminating against that em­
ployee for trying to become pregnant.139 Courts are unlikely to in­
terpret the PDA in a way that would allow this type of 
discrimination.140 
Finally, the remedies and procedures available under the PDA 
are the same as those available under the ADA.141 As a result, a 
plaintiff who chooses to pursue relief under the PDA rather than 
the ADA forfeits nothing in terms of potential remedies and in­
stead bases her demand for relief upon a statute more appropriately 
tailored to remedying reproductive discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
In defining disability, the ADA limits its scope to those impair­
ments which substantially limit a major life activity. Congress and 
the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the Act have de­
fined impairments expressly to include reproductive disorders. Re­
production, however, is conspicuously absent from the lists of 
illustrative major life activities. Although some members of Con-
138. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211. 
139. See Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 320. 
140. Another potential avenue of relief may be available under the ADA's third defini­
tion of disability. Under the third definition, if an individual with a reproductive disorder is 
"regarded as" unable to work or perform other major life activities as a result of the disorder, 
a court may find that individual entitled to relief, even if the individual seeking relief is not 
actually limited in any major life activities at all. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994); see also 
EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) § 902.8 (1993). The third definition protects persons whose im­
pairments are substantially limiting only as the result of the attitudes of others toward their 
impairment. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); 
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1991); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902.8(a). The third defini­
tion disability is purely subjective. The defendant employer need not even know whether the 
plaintiff actually has the condition, or whether the condition he regards the plaintiff as having 
would qualify as a disability under the ADA's first definition. So long as the employer "re­
gards" the employee as disabled, the employee meets the ADA's third definition. According 
to EEOC regulations, an individual is "disabled" under the ADA's third definition of disabil­
ity when that individual: "(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substan­
tially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity (e.g., an employer] as 
constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) 
Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h) (1) or (2) of this section but is treated 
by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(/). 
Qualification under the third definition, however, depends on the specific facts of the case. 
One employer may perceive infertility as substantially limiting certain major life activities 
while another employer may perceive no limitations at all. See EEOC Comp!. Man. (CCH) 
§ 902.8(a). 
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (mandating that the powers, remedies, and proce­
dures set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be the powers, remedies, and procedures 
provided under the ADA). 
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gress apparently believed ADA coverage of asyi;nptomatic HIV­
positive individuals to be based on limitations in reproduction, a 
more thorough analysis of the reasons why the ADA covers asymp­
tomatic individuals with HIV reveals that limitations on reproduc­
tive capabilities do not form the basis for ADA coverage. Further, 
the legislative history of the ADA provides no support for the prop­
osition that purely reproductive disorders should be covered under 
the ADA. 
Without a clear statutory basis or other Congressional mandate 
to include reproduction as a major life activity, substantial consider­
ation ought to be given to the reasons Congress may have excluded 
reproduction from the list of illustrative major life activities. First, 
Congress intended to limit the definition of disability rather than 
provide coverage to every individual with an impairment.142 Sec­
ond, reproduction is qualitatively different from the major life ac­
tivities expressly acknowledged by Congress and the administrative 
agencies in charge of enforcing the Act.143 
All of the major life activities previously recognized by Con­
gress and the EEOC possess three characteristics: microfrequency, 
macrofrequency, and universality. These three characteristics 
should be recognized explicitly as necessary components of a major 
life activity under the ADA. Because reproduction lacks all three 
of these elements, it would distort the meaning of the ADA to 
classify reproduction as a major life activity. Expanding the scope 
of "major life activities" to include reproduction would be a con­
scious expansion of the law by the courts. Such a judicial expansion 
of the scope of major life activities would violate both the language 
of the ADA and congressional intent. 
142. See supra Part I. 
143. See supra Part III. 
